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Are T’sos Really Trusts?

Malcolm Merry*
Traditional Chinese forms of communal landholding, t’so and t’ong, are 
habitually referred to by judges and authors as trusts. This article investigates 
the basis for this description and examines whether and to what extent the 
description is legally accurate. It concludes that there is considerable doubt as 
to whether they really are trusts. 
Introduction
The Chinese customary phenomena of collective ownership, t’so and 
t’ong, by which much land in Hong Kong’s New Territories has long been 
held, defy analysis in terms of the common law system. They have been 
variously described as institutions, organisations, associations, entities, 
endowments, settlements, funds and trusts. Those nouns are often qualifi ed 
by a word indicative of their familial nature (clan, lineage, ancestral or 
hereditary) or of their purpose (worship, ritual, cult or charitable). These 
descriptions are at best approximate, for the phenomena are emanations 
of Ming and Tsing China.1 Their preservation in modern common-
law Hong Kong is a matter of irony if not perversity and is the result of 
historical happenstance.
The most frequent noun applied to t’sos and collective landholding 
t’ongs is the trust. The use of the language of trusts in this connection is 
so pervasive that it has become axiomatic that these ancient institutions 
are legally trusts. So when Deputy High Court Judge Lam (as then he 
was) essayed a summary of the law relating to t’sos in June 2002, he 
stated confi dently that “it has been established that the concept of trust 
is applicable to a Tso with the managers as trustees and the members as 
 * Department of Professional Legal Education, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. Whilst 
retaining full responsibility for the text, the author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of 
Prof Anthony Dicks QC and Dr James Hayes each of whom kindly commented on drafts of this 
article.
1 Endowments for the worship of ancestors by t’so and t’ong became popular after edicts of 
successive Tsing emperors in the 18 century encouraged the practice, although some existed 
before then (information from Prof Anthony Dicks). In 1904, at least a quarter of the land in 
the New Territories was estimated to be held by t’so or t’ong: Hayes, The Great Difference, Hong 
Kong’s New Territories and Its People 1898-2004 (HKUP, 2006), p 182, n 17.
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benefi ciaries”.2 A similar, if more dogmatic, statement, made by Chu J 
(as then she was) three months later, is contained in another summary.3 
Likewise, when Hong Kong land law texts deal with t’so and t’ong, 
the authors have no hesitation in labelling them Chinese customary 
trusts.4 The practice has spread to historical and sociological accounts 
of customary land tenure. So Professor Hugh Baker calls t’so and t’ong 
ancestral trusts and Doctor James Hayes calls them customary trusts.5 
Yet, how can these descriptions be legally accurate? The trust is a 
concept of the common-law system. T’so and t’ong are concepts of 
customary law. In their summaries both judges recognised this apparent 
contradiction but drew no conclusions from it. Deputy Judge Lam was 
content simply to note that the imposition of a trust upon a t’so “is an 
application of concepts of English law to a Chinese customary institution”, 
as if this was perfectly natural. He went on to say, however, that “by 
reason of local circumstances” certain concepts in English trust law, such 
as the rule against perpetuities, had been held to be inapplicable, without 
observing that this was inconsistent with the idea that a t’so is a trust. 
Chu J merely noted what Deputy Judge Lam had said. No alarm bell rang 
that might have led the judges to trace the origin of the suggestion that 
a t’so is a trust and to question its authenticity.6
It will be the contention of this article that whilst applying the 
description “trust” to t’so and t’ong might seem convenient, it is at best an 
approximation and is dubious legally. The assertion, which has become 
an assumption, that these customary institutions are trusts is built on a 
fl imsy foundation which has never been tested at appellate level.
Most of the cases in which a customary land institution has been 
described as a trust concern a t’so rather than a t’ong of the communal 
landholding variety, so in what follows “t’so” will be used for simplicity 
to indicate the customary institution. The description “t’ong” occurs 
in respect of organisations which have no connection with the New 
Territories or with customary collective landholding, whereas “t’so” is 
always a description for clan and family land ownership named after 
2 Leung Kuen Fai v Tang Kwong Yu (or U) T’ong or Tang Kwong Yu Tso [2002] 2 HKLRD 705 
at 717.
3 In Tang Kam Wah v Tang Ming Yat (unrep., HCA 10141/1998, [2002] HKEC 1443) para 68.
4 Lee and Goo Hong Kong Land Law (3rd edn, 2009), pp 488–493; Wilkinson and Sihombing, 
Hong Kong Conveyancing Vol. 1, Law and Practice I [31] and [46]; Nield, Hong Kong Land Law 
(2nd edn), Ch 8.
5 H.R.D. Baker, A Chinese Lineage Village (Cass, London, 1968), Ch 4; in Ch 7 Baker calls them 
“kinship-ritual trusts”; Hayes, The Great Difference, n 1 above, Ch 3; in the new introduction 
to the reissue of The Hong Kong Region 1850-1911 (Hong Kong University Press, 2012), Hayes 
refers to them as “corporate lineage trusts” (p xiv).
6 T’sos have been accepted to be trusts in subsequent cases, eg: Wong Kam Pok Tso v 李強 (unrep., 
DCMP 2197 2006, [2010] HKEC 469); Mak Lai Chuen v Lau Kar Yau [2009] 3 HKC 217.
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a common ancestor. However, there is no distinction between the t’so 
and the communal landholding ancestral t’ong which is material to the 
question of whether they are trusts.7
Analogies with Trusts
A t’so certainly exhibits similarities to a trust. The founders of a t’so put 
land into it, reminiscent of a settlor placing land upon trust. The income 
from the land is used for the benefi t of descendants of the founders 
through the male line, those descendants resembling benefi ciaries 
under a trust. The income is often also used for religious, educational 
and welfare purposes, which call to mind charitable trusts.8 T’sos have 
managers, analogous to trustees. The land is usually registered in their 
names as well as that of the t’so. 
The appellation has gone beyond convenient approximation, 
however. The courts in Hong Kong seem to regard t’so as settlement 
trusts.9 Judges and some experts have taken to calling and treating the 
managers as trustees in law and calling and treating the descendants as 
benefi ciaries at law. Judges have imposed trustee duties upon the former 
for the protection of the latter. 
This treatment is justifi ed where the founder has made a declaration 
of trust and explicitly appointed managers as trustees when dedicating 
land to the t’so. In that event, the founder has chosen to adopt a 
mechanism from the common law system so as to create a settlement of 
the land upon trustees for the benefi t of the members of the t’so. Such 
a declaration is, however, rare and could have occurred only where the 
t’so was set up during the 20th century, after the common law came to 
the New Territories with British administration, and then only in the 
event that the founder engaged a solicitor to set up the trust.10 The great 
majority of t’sos are of greater vintage, having been founded under Tsing 
rule or earlier and being in place when the British took over. Although 
those t’sos were established entirely under Chinese customary law, yet the 
judicial practice has been to treat them as trusts.
 7 In the author’s experience, the colloquial expression “t’so t’ong”, embracing both types of 
institution, is used by rural inhabitants.
 8 But t’so and t’ong cannot be charitable in the legal sense since they do not benefi t the public at 
large.
 9 As, for instance, Deputy High Court Judge Tang (as then he was) expressly did in Kan Fat Tat v 
Kan Yin Tat [1987] HKLR 516.
10 An instance of such a settlement is that in Chu Tak Hing v Chu Chan Cheung Kiu [1968] HKLR 542. 
Mak Lai Chuen v Lau Kar Yau [2009] 3 HKC 217, DC may be another example. 
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Tang v Tang
The source of this practice is a judgment of Mills-Owens J in 1970, 
Tang Kai Chung v Tang Chik Shang11 (hereinafter Tang) in which the 
institution of the t’so was fi rst subjected to extended judicial analysis. 
The analysis was performed with the benefi t of expert evidence as to 
Chinese law and custom, for the judge (in common with all members 
of the Hong Kong judiciary at the time) professed no special knowledge 
of these traditional institutions. The case was a dispute between 
members of a t’so of the extensive Tang clan from the northwestern 
New Territories: some wanted land held by the t’so in Demarcation 
District 121 near Yuen Long to be partitioned, others did not. The 
court decided that the law of partition did not apply because the t’so 
land was intended to be held perpetually and not to be alienated. In the 
course of a 42-page judgment, however, the judge described the nature 
of a t’so and examined its relationship with modern common law and 
statute. Amongst other matters he held that a t’so is a trust and the 
managers are trustees who are subject to the provisions of the Trustee 
Ordinance.
Early in the judgment, Mills-Owens J set out his understanding of 
what a t’so was. “Speaking generally,” he said:
“A tso may be shortly described as an ancient Chinese institution of ancestral 
land-holding whereby land derived from a common ancestor is enjoyed 
by his male descendants for the time being for their lifetimes and so from 
generation to generation indefi nitely.”
The descendant automatically becomes entitled at birth to the interest in 
the land for life, the judge explained, and on death that interest merges 
with the interests of the surviving members of the t’so, automatically 
enlarging their interests.12
The judge’s description was made with the benefi t of having heard 
expert evidence as to Chinese customary law. It will be noted that the 
interest of the male descendant as described is an interest in the land, 
not in the t’so, and that there is no mention of the interest being merely 
benefi cial. Indeed, in defi ning a t’so, Mills-Owens J does not mention the 
managers, the putative trustees and legal owners of the land, at all. This 
is not surprising because in giving this short defi nition the judge was 
11 [1970] HKLR 276.
12 Tang at pp 279–280. The qualifi cations that Mills-Owens J was speaking generally and was 
attempting a short description should not be overlooked.
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confi ning himself to customary law and Chinese customary law has no 
conception equivalent to a trust.
As described by the judge and by experts in Chinese customary law, 
the interest of a member of the t’so is a joint interest with other current 
living members. Entitlement to that interest arises automatically at 
birth and is not derived through some other person. The interest is not 
heritable; in that respect the interest is more like joint tenancy13 with 
its right of survivorship than tenancy-in-common which passes into the 
estate of a deceased co-owner. Unity of possession, unity of interest and 
unity of title are also present as with joint tenancy but not the fourth 
unity, that of time. According to Mills-Owens J’s account, the interest of 
each member vests at birth and ends at death, occasions which will occur 
at different times for each member.
The character for t’so (祖) simply implies the male descendants 
of the person whose name precedes that character.14 The method of 
customary landholding under a t’so defi es categorisation in common 
law terms. But what is clear is that it is a form of co-ownership and 
that each member (living male descendant) receives a direct interest 
in the land. It is therefore on the face of matters perplexing that later 
in his judgment Mills-Owens J declares the t’so to be a trust with the 
managers (registered with the District Offi ce) as trustees, for that 
would mean that the members would have merely an equitable interest 
as benefi ciaries and that the sole legal owners of the land, who should 
be registered at the Land Registry as such, would be the managers and 
not the t’so.
What impelled Mills-Owens J to that declaration? The judge relied 
on the terms of the Crown lease of 1905 under which the land had been 
granted (or perhaps more accurately, re-granted) to the t’so by the new 
administration in the name of King Edward VII for a term of 75 years 
with right of renewal for a further 24 years less three days.15 As is common 
with rural New Territories land, the lease took the form of a block grant, 
that is to say one deed of lease covering all the lots in an entire district. 
This had been used in order to simplify the process of making mass grants 
following the acquisition of the New Territories in 1898, since there were 
many thousands of lots for which Crown leases had to be issued and the 
administration was anxious to levy Crown rent on the owners as soon as 
13 Or the defunct method of joint ownership, coparcenary.
14 As recorded on the Land Register and the Crown lease and before that on the Ching land 
register.
15 Thus, if the option were exercised, taking the term to 27 June 1997, ie shortly before expiry of 
the United Kingdom’s holding of the New Territories.
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possible so as to meet the costs of running the “new territory”.16 The body 
of the lease was printed and in general terms, applicable to all the lots in 
the district. Details of the individual lots which were the subject of the 
grant were given in a schedule at the end of the lease. The schedule was 
in common form with columns for the number of the lot, its size, its use, 
its address, the term, the name of the owner (ie grantee) in Chinese and 
in English, the Crown rent and so on. The entries under the columns 
were written in manuscript. Where the grantee of a particular lot was a 
customary institution, the practice was to name against the lot number 
the t’so or t’ong and follow this with the names of the managers, all in 
Chinese. In the next column was a translation (or, more accurately, a 
transliteration) of the Chinese names into English.17 In the case of t’sos 
and t’ongs, there would be a transliteration of the name of the t’so or 
t’ong followed by the name in English of each manager. In the schedule 
in question, as no doubt in many others, this name was followed by 
“(trustee)”.
On the basis of this parenthetical word, Mills-Owens J concluded that 
the grant had been made to the managers as trustees in law.18 In other 
words, the trust had been created not by a settlement but by the Crown 
grant. 
Crown Lease Schedule
To the mind of this writer, there are substantial grounds to doubt the 
correctness of this conclusion. First, it overlooks what is manifest from 
the contents of the schedule, that the name of the grantees in English 
followed by “(trustee)” is a transliteration or translation of the Chinese 
entry in the immediately adjacent column. Therefore, the entry in 
English has no force additional to that of the Chinese characters. Only 
if the Chinese entry contained the equivalent of “trustee” could that 
word have effect to impose a trust. Unfortunately, the Chinese entry is 
not reproduced in the judgment but it seems highly unlikely that any 
indication of trusteeship would have been given there. The description 
favoured for the managers of a t’so was the Cantonese “sze lei”, meaning 
16 The Hong Kong Government had been instructed by the Colonial Offi ce in London that the 
New Territory (as it was initially called) was not to place a fi nancial strain on the colony: 
Hayes, The Great Difference, n 1 above, p 30 and p 193, n 3.
17 Mills-Owens J refers to it as a translation but the column in schedules seen by the author is 
headed “transliteration” which is a more accurate description of the contents of the column. 
This is also the experience of Dr James Hayes (personal communication). 
18 Tang at p 304.
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nominee, manager or administrator. In the 19th century, there were no 
Chinese characters for a trustee. The modern Chinese term (信託), 
“shun tolk” in Cantonese, is a 20th century commercial innovation 
believed to be derived from the Chinese name adopted by western trust 
companies. This was not used in connection with managers of t’so. In 
any event, the concept of a manager is different from that of a trustee. 
This is so in English and is apparent also in Chinese traditional usage 
from the custom that sze lei would not act without the blessing of all 
the members of the t’so.
The presence of parentheses around “trustee” may also be signifi cant. 
They suggest that the description is incidental and may not have been 
used in the Chinese but is an explanation added in English. It is as if 
whoever fi lled in the columns by hand was concerned to indicate that 
each of the three names was not an owner as such but was a representative 
of the t’so. In other words, the choice of “trustee” was not made in order to 
refl ect a status or impose a trust but to emphasise that the grant was made 
to the t’so itself and to explain why three individual names follow the 
name of the t’so in the owner column. The composers of the details in the 
schedule may have felt that the description “manager” was insuffi ciently 
legalistic.
Who were those composers? The entry itself would probably have 
been the work of a clerk since there were 477 block Crown leases with 
accompanying schedules created between 1905 and 1910;19 these 
would have recorded the details of hundreds of thousands of lots. 
The clerk would have been acting on instructions from more senior 
staff who in turn would have based the entries on the fi ndings of the 
surveyors. Each block lease indenture and each schedule was checked 
and signed off by an assistant land offi cer who was responsible for the 
demarcation district to which the lease referred and who was also a 
member of the Land Court.20 This court was an informal tribunal so 
the members did not need to have legal qualifi cations: in fact the 
offi cers were cadet administrators, so they were well-educated civil 
servants. The offi cer’s signature indicated that the lease had been 
“examined and found correct” before it was signed by the Governor 
on behalf of the Crown. Even so, many mistakes in the leases were 
subsequently uncovered.21 It seems unlikely that the checking would 
have involved an investigation as to whether the “trustees” really 
19 Information from Mr Roger Nissim, former District Lands Offi cer and Adjunct Professor at 
the Department of Real Estate and Construction of the Faculty of Architecture, University of 
Hong Kong.
20 Information from Dr James Hayes. The Land Court is considered further below.
21 Hayes, The Great Difference, n 1 above, p 39 and p 199, n 53.
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were trustees in law or a conscious decision to give them that status. 
Rather, the word was probably a standard translation of the characters 
for “sze lei”.
In any event, the schedule contains no words of grant: it is merely a 
record of details pursuant to the grant in the body of the lease. That body 
declared its purpose to be to grant a lease “to the several persons, clans, 
families, and ‘t’ongs’ whose names are set out in the Schedule hereunder 
written”.22 The operative words stated that the King “doth hereby grant 
and demise unto each Lessee ALL that piece or parcel of ground situate, 
lying and being in Survey District No. 121 in the NT in the Colony 
of Hong Kong set out and described in the Schedule hereto opposite 
to the name of such Lessee … according to the lot number set out in 
the Schedule hereto opposite to the name of such Lessee”.23 There is 
no mention here of status or capacity except that of lessee. There is no 
indication that the grant is in any way qualifi ed by the words in the 
schedule. The grantee named in the schedule is the t’so which, having no 
personality separate from its members, consists of its members.
Since the grant was plainly intended to be to the t’so (the living male 
descendants of the ancestor after whom the t’so is named) rather than to 
the individual managers, the intention cannot have been to constitute 
the managers as trustees. Trustees are by defi nition legal owners of the 
land which they hold on trust so, had the three names been truly trustees, 
the owner column in the schedule should have begun with them rather 
than the t’so, perhaps adding that they were holding for the benefi t or on 
behalf of the t’so or its members. But this treatment would have been in 
defi ance of the words quoted above from the start of the lease by which 
it is made apparent that grantees could include customary institutions: 
clans, families and t’ongs.
Contemporaneous Legislation
A grant to the institution rather than to the managers as trustees 
would have been entirely consistent with the nature of t’so and with 
the contemporaneous legislative treatment of them. In 1905 not only 
were block grants made to owners of New Territories land, including 
t’so and t’ong, but an ordinance was passed dealing with customary 
22 Tang, p 289. The wording refl ects that used in contemporaneous legislation, now s 15 of the 
New Territories Ordinance, Cap 97.
23 Tang, p 290. There is an obvious typographical error in the report in that it says “demise unto 
each Lease” rather than Lessee.
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law and with managers of traditional institutions.24 That legislation 
provided, in what is now s 13 of the New Territories Ordinance,25 that 
the courts may apply customary law: this was interpreted in Tang as 
being obligatory. 
Another section of the 1905 legislation, now s 15 of the New 
Territories Ordinance, made convoluted provision regarding managers. 
Where land was held in the name of a “clan, family or tong”, a manager 
was to be appointed by the clan, family or t’ong to represent it.26 The 
appointment was to be reported to the District Offi ce and, if proved, 
was to be approved by that offi ce which would register the name on 
a register of managers. The manager would then have “full power to 
dispose of or in any way deal with the land as if he were the sole owner 
thereof”, subject to the consent of the District Offi ce to the transaction. 
The manager was also to be personally liable for payment of rent and 
charges and for observance of the covenants and conditions in the 
lease. Furthermore, every instrument regarding the land executed or 
signed by the registered manager in the presence of and attested by the 
District Offi cer was to be effectual for all purposes as if executed and 
signed by all the members.
These provisions are inconsistent with a manager being a trustee. 
First, the section expressly refers to the land being held in the name of 
the clan, family or t’ong, not as being held by the managers as trustees for 
them. Second, the section deals with the appointment of a manager, not 
a “manager and trustee”; indeed it does not mention trust or trustee at 
all. If the intention had been to impose upon managers the obligations 
of a trustee, what would have been simpler than to say so? The section 
was interfering with the customary law by bestowing upon the manager 
powers of sole ownership. If the government’s intention also had been to 
interfere with custom by imposing trustee duties upon the manager, one 
would have expected that to be in the legislation as well. 
Instead, the section refers to the members of the family or t’ong 
appointing a manager “to represent it”, in other words to act as an agent. 
If the manager had been intended to be a trustee, he would not have 
been a mere representative but the legal owner of the land. Elsewhere 
in the ordinance there is a reference to trustees, so the absence of the 
24 New Territories Land Ordinance 1905.
25 Cap 97.
26 Clan and family land refers to t’so and to t’ong in which a family has chosen to append the 
character for t’ong after the proper or informal (nick) name of an ancestor. The separate 
mention of t’ong was probably to ensure that s 15 covers non-family common landholding 
organisations such as temples, monasteries, nunneries and charities.
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use of that word in s 15 is unlikely to have been an oversight.27 The 
section institutionalised and adapted the existing practice in t’so and 
t’ong of appointing a “sze lei”, or rather a number of “sze lei”.28 This is a 
Cantonese term which translates as manager or representative but not 
as trustee.
However, the best point that emerges from s 15 against the manager 
being a trustee arises from the express effect of the registration of the 
manager: he was to have full power to dispose of and deal with the land 
as if he were the sole owner thereof. If managers were trustees, they 
would not need this power and status because they would already have 
them. It is axiomatic, indeed elementary, that trustees of land are legal 
owners of the land. It would make no sense for the legislature to bestow 
upon managers the power of disposal of the land as if they were sole 
owners unless the legislators, and the drafters of the legislation in the 
government, were of the view that the managers were not already the 
sole legal owners of the land and therefore not trustees.29
The evident purpose of s 15 is to facilitate dealings in the land. As 
Briggs J pointed out in 1966, but for the statutory appointment of the 
registered manager as sole representative, the land could be conveyed 
only if the documents were executed by all the members of the t’so, a 
cumbersome and inconvenient, and often impractical, requirement.30 It 
might be added that it was not just conveyance of the land that would 
have been diffi cult. More importantly (since t’so land is in principle 
inalienable so sale would have been rare), the mortgaging of the land 
would have been hindered, as might the collection of government 
rent, rates and other charges and the enforcement of covenants in 
the government grant.31 None of these diffi culties would have been 
encountered if the managers were also trustees.
Section 15 had an additional purpose: the protection of members of 
the t’so or t’ong from misfeasance by managers by requiring not only that 
managers be approved but also that any transaction be carried out with 
the approval and witnessing of the District Offi ce. This, too, would have 
27 Section 18 of Cap 97. This argument was considered but rejected by Chu J in Tang Kam Wah v 
Tang Ming Yat, n 3 above, para 61, for reasons which are not convincing.
28 The usual arrangement was that each fong or branch (or sub-branch) of the clan would appoint 
one of the managers.
29 Most managers are members of the t’so or t’ong and therefore a joint owner in the capacity of a 
member but they are not the sole owners. Occasionally a manager is not a member, eg where 
she is the widow of a deceased manager: being female, she cannot be a member.
30 Lai Chi Kok Amusement Park (No. 2) v Tsang Tin-Sun [1966] HKLR 124 at 130.
31 The effi cient collection of Crown rent would have been a priority for the new administration 
in 1905 because of the Colonial Offi ce direction in 1898 that the New Territories were not to 
be a burden on the fi nances of the colony: Hayes, The Great Difference, n 1 above, p 193, n 3.
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been unnecessary had the managers been trustees, for the duties imposed 
in equity upon trustees would have provided protection to the members 
as benefi ciaries.
Events of 1898–1905
It is not just the legislation at the beginning of the 20th century concerning 
customary landholding that points against an intention to impose a 
trust upon managers, the history of events at that time surrounding the 
acquisition of “the Hong Kong Extension” is also inconsistent with such 
an intention.
The new governor of Hong Kong in 1898 was Sir Henry Blake, a man 
of genial character with wide experience as a colonial administrator.32 
Blake’s experience told him that it was important to reassure the local 
population that the change in administration would have little affect on 
their daily lives, particularly in respect of land and money. Accordingly 
when Britain took possession of “the new territory” in April 1899, 
Blake issued a proclamation in Chinese pursuant to the New Territories 
Order-in-Council by which the extension had been constitutionally 
incorporated into the colony of Hong Kong. The proclamation told 
inhabitants of the newly acquired area that their “commercial and landed 
interests will be safeguarded and … usages and good customs will not in 
any way be interfered with”.33 This was not legislation but it showed the 
government’s intention and policy towards land in the New Territories.
In order to emphasise the change in authority and to set a sound 
basis for the collection of revenue in the form of rent, Crown leases 
were to be issued to existing landholders and a reliable rent roll drawn 
up. To achieve this, and to ensure the protection of established landed 
interests, the new administrators had fi rst to fi nd out who owned what 
land. The land registry of the Chinese government was found to be 
inaccurate, so a complete survey of the 365 square miles of the New 
Territories had to be undertaken. Hong Kong lacked the expertise to 
perform this enormous task, so land surveyors were brought in from 
the Survey of India.34 The great land survey, which began in 1899, 
took much longer to conduct than anticipated owing to adverse 
32 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (Harper Collins, 1997), p 330.
33 A translation of the proclamation is set out in the judgment of Roberts CJ in Winfat Enterprises 
(HK) Co Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] HKLR 32.
34 The Survey of India, the land survey department of the government of India, still exists and is 
the oldest extant department of that government.
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conditions (heat, ill health, mountainous terrain, language diffi culties 
and uncooperative population) and was not completed until 1904.35 
There were disputes about ownership, so a Land Court was established 
in 1900 to adjudicate upon claims.36 Titles were to be granted once the 
claims had been confi rmed. Entitlements were judged in accordance 
with Chinese law and custom. This meant that members of the court 
had fi rst to ascertain the relevant law, which delayed adjudication but 
showed that the new administration was serious in its promise to honour 
local custom.37
The Land Court having completed its work by early 1905, the New 
Territories Land Ordinance was passed that year.38 This gave the Land 
Offi cer and the courts power to enforce Chinese custom and customary 
right. As has been seen, it also provided for registration of managers of t’so 
and t’ong and gave them full power to deal with the land subject to the 
supervision of the District Offi ces. With the necessary information for 
the schedules and the legislation in place, block Crown leases could be 
issued with the term of their grant beginning as from 1898. The purpose 
of the block leases was to re-grant the land to the established owners in 
an administratively convenient way, not to alter the identity or status of 
those owners.39
If the block leases of land to customary institutions had been 
intended to convert their managers from mere representatives into 
trustees, that would have been contrary to the terms of the proclamation 
which declared that landed interests were to be safeguarded and 
customs were not to be interfered with. In that event, members of 
t’so and t’ong would have been demoted from legal owners of the land 
to mere benefi ciaries, and managers would have been promoted from 
their customary role as mere representatives of the owners to legal 
owners of the land.
Accordingly, the background to the grant of the block leases suggests 
that there was no intent to convert t’so and t’ong into trusts through 
35 Hayes, The Great Difference, n 1 above (p 32) suggests that the survey was completed in 1903.
36 Land Court (New Territories) Ordinance 1900.
37 Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty (Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1980), pp 94–97.
38 Mills-Owens J says in Tang that the court fi nished its work in 1904 and Hayes, The Great 
Difference, n 1 above (p 36) is to the same effect, but Wesley-Smith in Unequal Treaty gives 
1905; the latter seems more likely since the court could hardly conclude all adjudication until 
the survey had been completed.
39 However, because in Imperial Chinese practice there could be an owner of the topsoil (or skin 
of the land) and an owner of the subsoil (or bones of the land), this did necessitate choosing 
between the two: generally, the former was chosen and granted a Crown lease; the latter was 
(somewhat dubiously) regarded as having a rentcharge only. 
Binder for HKLJ.indb   680 12/17/2012   4:11:48 PM
Vol 42 Part 3 Are T’sos Really Trusts? 681
the medium of the government grant. Ironically, Mills-Owens J set out 
much of this background (but not the proclamation) in his judgment 
in Tang yet did not draw any lessons of interpretation from it. That 
may be because in 1970 the approach to the construction of contracts 
and deeds was more literal than now. During subsequent decades, a 
contextual, rather than textual, approach has found favour so that the 
courts now look at the words used in their setting. This includes the 
factual and legal background as well as the practical objects which the 
words were intended to achieve.40
Opportunity for Re-consideration?
In one respect at least, Mills-Owens J’s interpretation of the schedule 
to the Crown lease has certainly proved incorrect. In summarising the 
schedule’s contents, the judge asserts that user of the lot is limited to the 
use stated under the heading “description of the lot”: so a lot which is 
described as “padi” (as the land in question before him was) could not be 
used for any purpose other than rice-growing. The view that the use stated 
in the schedule was prescriptive (or restrictive) rather than descriptive 
was however exploded in 1982 when the Court of Appeal decided in 
Attorney-General v Melhado Investment Ltd41 that the description was just 
that and did no more than aid identifi cation of the lot. Yet until then the 
view that the description of use was also a restriction on use had been 
held with a tenacity similar to the view that t’sos are trusts.
Is there an opportunity for a similar re-consideration of the trust view 
of t’sos? The view has been repeated so often, by so many judges, that 
it has taken on the appearance of a matter of precedent, even though 
(the author hopes) it has been demonstrated to lack a basis in principle. 
Nevertheless, the view has been expressed mainly at fi rst instance. Where 
the Court of Appeal has accepted it, the view has not been in issue.
Therefore, in Wong Shing Chau v To Kwok Keung the point was 
conceded and not argued.42 No expert evidence as to the existence of 
trusts in Chinese custom had been presented at trial. Le Pichon JA 
summarised the propositions as to customary institutions made by Deputy 
Judge Lam in Leung Kuen Fai and stated that they were not challenged.
40 Jumbo King Ltd v Faithful Properties Ltd [1999] 3 HKLRD 757 at 773 (CFA). There is also much 
more published research about New Territories land available now than there was in 1970.
41 [1983] HKLR 422.
42 (unrep., CACV 20/2008, [2008] HKEC 969) paras 9 and 12.
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In Tang Yau Yee Tong v Tang Mou Tso, another dispute between 
members of the litigious Tang clan, Liu JA observed that in relation 
to t’sos, manager, trustee and sze lei were synonymous.43 As a simple 
statement as to how these terms are used in fact, this observation is 
accurate: they tend to be employed interchangeably in the context 
of t’so and t’ong to mean the same thing. Liu JA seems to intend to 
convey no more than that. But if he had meant to make a fi nding that 
managers or sze lei are trustees (as one later judge in yet another Tang 
clan dispute appears to have thought),44 the observation would have 
been incidental and unnecessary for the decision, so would have been 
obiter dictum. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the question of whether t’sos are trusts 
remains open at appellate level. One might anticipate, however, that the 
Court of Appeal would be reluctant to disturb an assertion which has 
attracted widespread approval at lower judicial levels and which leads to 
convenient results. By calling t’so trusts, the courts give themselves the 
comfort of a familiar concept and access to a body of familiar rules which 
can be employed for the protection of members of these institutions.
Yet that protection is not really necessary, for customary and statute 
law already provides it. Any attempt by managers to sell t’so land for their 
personal benefi t is rendered impossible by the customary requirement 
that there be unanimous clan support for the sale and by the provisions of 
s 15 of the New Territories Ordinance which impose formal requirements 
upon disposals of the land. Likewise, any dealing in the land such as 
a letting is regulated by the section and by the customary requirement 
that all managers consent to the dealing. The handling of rent or other 
income from the land, including distribution of compensation for land 
resumed by the authorities for public purposes, would also be the subject 
of unanimous decision by the managers under customary practice.
It might be said that the overlaying of a common-law institution upon 
a customary one is of little consequence and can do only good: the trust 
simply reinforces the dictates of custom. This is generally so where a dispute 
is between members or managers of the t’so, as most litigation concerning 
them is. However, where the dispute affects the rights of others, the effect 
of imposing a trust on the t’so is not so benign. This is illustrated by Leung 
Kuen Fai, the case in which Deputy Judge Lam reviewed the principles 
applicable to customary institutions. The plaintiff there had occupied t’so 
land without permission for a very long time and was claiming title by 
adverse possession. Had the owner been an individual, the plaintiff would 
43 [1996] 2 HKLR 212; the judge had been counsel for the successful defendant in Tang.
44 Chu J in Tang Kam Wah v Tang Ming Yat, n 3 above.
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have been able to repulse an action for possession and the owner’s title 
would have been extinguished. However, the normal limitation period 
was held not to apply because the t’so was also a trust and its members 
were benefi ciaries. This meant that the limitation period was not the 
normal 12 years from accrual of the owner’s right of action but was 6 years 
from the attaining of the age of majority (the time of accrual of a cause 
of action for possession) by any benefi ciary. Since new members of the 
t’so were continually being born, the limitation period was continually 
being extended. All the defendant had to show was that a child who was 
a member of the t’so had been born within the past 24 years (the statutory 
age of majority of 18 years plus 6 years’ limitation period) to show that the 
statutory bar had not descended.45 Thus the imposition of a trust gives t’sos 
a great privilege: as the judge observed, they are effectively immune from 
the law of limitation of actions.
Limits of the Trust
Even if the trust analysis based on the parenthetical translation in the 
schedule to the Crown lease were to be upheld after full consideration 
by the appellate courts, it would apply only to those lots for which the 
word “trustee” had been used in the schedule to describe the managers. 
The practice of those who composed and completed the schedules may 
not have been consistent. The author has come across one block lease 
schedule in which only Chinese descriptions appear to have been used. 
If the clerks and their seniors at the Land Offi ce followed the habit 
of their counterparts at the Land Registry, they would have used the 
label “manager” as often as they used “trustee” and apparently without 
discrimination. Then there are Crown leases which have been lost and 
those that have schedules that are illegible. There would be no basis 
upon which to conclude that a trust had been imposed by the grant in 
such cases.
An Alternative Basis?
If there is no trust by grant, what of the possibility that t’so and t’ong are 
settlement trusts? By and large, since the decision in Tang judges have 
not asked themselves about the nature of the trust, being content merely 
45 This assumes that the statutory rather than the customary age of majority applies. Chinese 
custom was that a person attains majority at about the age of 14 (source: Prof Anthony Dicks).
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to assert that a trust exists. An exception was Kan Fai Tat v Kan Yin Tat46 
in which 18 lots of land at Tseung Pak Long near Sheung Shui had been 
purchased and registered in the name of a t’so in and between 1935 and 
1949. The then Deputy High Court Judge Tang said:
“I believe that in the event of a conveyance to a Tso the law will presume 
an intention to create a trust over the properties, in favour of members of 
the Tso from time to time, subject to such limitation or conditions as may be 
imposed on such properties by Chinese custom or customary rights affecting 
such land.”
This, then, is a different basis from that postulated by Mills-Owens J in 
Tang. There could have been no trust imposed by government grant in 
Kan because the founding of the t’so occurred after the block grants of 
1905. Nor, apparently, was it a case of the founder creating an express 
trust with the aid of legal advisers as had happened with at least one 
other 20th-century t’so. Instead, the deputy judge’s suggestion was that a 
trust was implied by law.
The judge in Kan cited no authority and gave no reasons for his 
assertion that the law presumes of intention by founders of a t’so to 
create a trust. Presumably, the presumption was thought to arise from the 
circumstance that the founders had put the land into the t’so by registering 
it in the name of the t’so. But, as has been seen, the effect of doing that 
was, according to Chinese customary law, to constitute members of the 
t’so joint owners of the land rather than mere benefi ciaries, and not to 
constitute the managers as the owners, as they would have been had 
they been trustees. It is diffi cult to see how a court would be justifi ed in 
presuming any intention from the placing of land into the ownership 
of a t’so except an intention to create a t’so and thereby make all living 
male descendants joint legal owners of the land. To presume an intention 
to create a trust with the managers as trustees and legal owners and the 
living male descendants merely benefi ciaries would be inconsistent with 
that intention.
If, by saying that the putative trust was subject to such limitations 
imposed on the properties by Chinese custom or customary rights, the 
learned deputy judge meant to recognise the paramountcy of those rights 
in the question of whether there was a trust, he was in effect contradicting 
himself in the course of one sentence, for custom limits the manager’s 
role to something less than that of a trustee and allows the members 
46 [1987] HKLR 516; hereinafter Kan.
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rights exceeding those of a benefi ciary. But perhaps the qualifi cation 
“on such properties” was the deputy judge’s way of confi ning the effect 
of customary law to the land as distinct from the landholding: in other 
words, custom dictates only the terms of the trust so far as they relate to 
the land and does not affect the existence of the trust.
If the latter was what was meant, it is respectfully suggested that 
the distinction between the trust and its terms is unjustifi ed and that 
any limitation of the effect of customary law to the terms of the trust 
is unsustainable. It is true that in Tang Mills-Owens J explained that 
the terms of the trust were the rules of customary law but this was 
an attempt to accommodate the customary law within the framework 
of the trust which he had deduced to arise from the schedule to the 
Crown lease. As it is hoped has been demonstrated, that deduction 
was not only dubious but was in plain contradiction of the nature of 
a t’so. In fi nding that there was a trust, the judge in Tang was failing 
to obey the injunction in s 13 of the New Territories Ordinance to 
apply customary law—ironically, because he himself had found that its 
application was mandatory. Similarly, in fi nding that there was a trust 
in Kan, the deputy judge was also failing to obey that injunction, in 
effect ousting the custom and amending the nature of a t’so by imposing 
a common-law construct upon it.
The basis of the imposition of a trust in Kan is as debateable as that 
in Tang. The founders of the t’so were said to have intended a trust, 
presumably a trust of the sort which arises when two persons have 
a common purpose with regard to property. Perpetual purpose trusts 
are not known to the common law system, unless they are charitable 
trusts. Although the purposes of t’so or t’ong can include religious and 
educational purposes, they are not charitable because the benefi ciaries 
of the trust are not the general public but a limited class, certain male 
persons from a clan who also happen to be members of the t’so or t’ong. 
Proponents of the trust analysis would no doubt counter that it is here 
that custom trumps equity so as to allow a perpetual settlement: this is 
what Deputy Judge Lam seemed to imply in his summary in Leung Kuen 
Fai. But why at this point and not earlier? The very fact that proponents 
have to qualify the effect of their trust suggests that the trust analysis is 
fl awed in the fi rst place.
It was in any event straining matters to presume an intention by 
the founders of a t’so to impose a trust upon the managers of their 
t’so. Such a presumption was not necessary to give effect to the t’so. 
The founders were operating within the confi nes of Chinese custom. 
It is doubtful that they would have known what a trust and its 
consequences were. They expressly intended to create a t’so, not a 
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trust. The processes of conveyance of the land into and registration 
of it in the name of the t’so alone realised that express intention. The 
presumption or implication that the founders intended to create a 
trust is contrary to the evidence of their actions. Its effect is partially 
to nullify those actions.
Conclusion
The description of t’sos as trusts is based on repeated assertion but little 
analysis and very questionable reasoning. The description appears to 
be motivated by a desire of common lawyers to equate these customary 
institutions with another institution which is familiar to them and 
thereby to protect the members of those institutions. Two attempts have 
been made to explain the basis for the assertion. The fi rst, by Mills-Owens 
J in Tang, relies upon the contents of the schedule to the block Crown 
lease to show the imposition of an express trust by grant. The second, by 
Tang Dep-J in Kan, simply states a presumed intention by founders of a 
t’so to settle the land on trust. Neither explanation is convincing.
T’sos are not trusts by government grant because that would be 
contrary to government policy at the time of the block grants, contrary to 
legislation contemporaneous with those grants, contrary to a reasonable 
interpretation of the terms of the grant and, not least, inconsistent with 
the contents of the customary law which gives t’sos their very existence. 
T’sos are not purpose trusts created by common intention because they 
are not charitable in nature and their creators have no intention to create 
a trust. The customary role of a manager is less than that of a trustee. The 
customary interest of a member of a t’so in the land is greater than that 
of a benefi ciary under a trust. Indeed, the nature of a trust is in confl ict 
with the nature of t’sos.
T’sos are inventions of Chinese rural culture and refl ect the values 
of that culture: reverence for ancestors, importance of the land to 
identity, solidarity of family and clan, and male dominance. They have 
captivated administrators, historians, anthropologists, lawyers and judges 
who have come into contact with them. For generations they have been 
part of the social fabric of that part of San On county which became 
the New Territories. That fabric and those values have however been 
worn down with the passage of time. Education, prosperity, building and 
infrastructural development, urbanisation, modern travel and improved 
communications have all had their effect to undermine these customary 
institutions. Let us not add to the list by insisting that t’sos are trusts.
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